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There are differences across Europe in elements of climate citizenship, including
climate concern, perceived responsibility, and willingness to support and take
climate action. This paper examines how individual-level climate perceptions
correspond to a country’s contribution to climate change and its ability to develop
climate policies. Data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (23 European
countries, n = 44,387) was used to explore how national-level factors (affluence as
per capita GDP, carbon emissions as per capita CO2 emissions, and democracy as
electoral democracy index) are related to individual-level climate perceptions
(climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and
personal climate action). The analysis shows that the studied individual-level
perceptions are all linked, and that perceived climate responsibility is a factor that
helps in understanding how individual-level climate views are connected. Further,
national-level affluence and democracy are connected to stronger individual-level
perceptions both directly and through mediating their connections. Our results
suggest that achieving ambitious climate policy targets in Europe could benefit from
focusing on the role of perceived climate responsibility in boosting policy support
and action. Moreover, the connection between national-level (democratic and
economic) factors and public climate perceptions emphasises the need to place
climate policies in a wider context.
Keywords: climate citizenship; public climate perceptions; affluence; carbon
emissions; electoral democracy; national context
1. Introduction
Climate change requires policy action across the entire globe due to the complex, multi-
layered, and trans-boundary nature of the phenomenon (Lidskog and Elander 2010). Pol-
itical attention has often been paid to the global responsibility of developed and industri-
alised nations, as they may be regarded both culpable of the climate crisis as well as
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capable of dealing with it (Bernauer 2013). Firstly, from the perspective of culpability we
may ask whether those who have contributed or currently contribute to climate change be
also the ones who are responsible for solving it (Freeman and Strandberg 2014; Klinsky
2018) (cf. ‘polluter pays principle’). Such ‘culpability’ may be assessed by considering a
country’s carbon emissions (e.g. Caney 2005; Höhne et al. 2011). Secondly, climate
responsibility may be conceived of as a duty for those who are able to make a contribution
to climate change mitigation now and in the future (cf. ‘ability to pay principle’). Such
‘capability’ implies capacities to deal with the issue (Comim 2008; Schlosberg 2012)
and may include economic and political affordances.
Although conflating the responsibility as capability and culpability is ill-advised
(Miller 2007), it is worth noting that they are not mutually exclusive. In the context of
climate change, the individuals and countries who contribute to climate change the
least also tend to be the least able to bear the costs of climate mitigation policies, and
further, the most vulnerable with regards to climate change, and hence more reliant on
others taking responsibility (Stern 2007; Füssell 2010). Globally, Europe may be con-
sidered a leading actor in setting ambitious climate targets and programmes (Helm
2014; European Commission 2020). However, establishing tangible carbon emission
reductions has proven to be much more demanding, both in terms of decarbonising
energy supplies and energy demand reduction through energy efficiency and curtailment
measures. Furthermore, Europe is a heterogeneous region with differing socio-political
traditions and resources (e.g. Arnold et al. 2016), which impedes the development and
implementation of a joint climate policy agenda.
Another aspect of climate politics consists of the extent to which climate change miti-
gation is or should be a duty of individuals (often as consumers or citizens) (Middlemiss
2010; Cuomo 2011; Vihersalo 2017). Growing environmental and climate awareness has
fostered the development of a new ideal of climate citizenship, in which individuals’
membership in a community and their commitment to rights, entitlements, and obligations
happens in relation to the environment and particularly to climate change (Dobson 2007;
Lane 2016; Nelson 2016).
Previous studies have found that differences in European citizens’ perceptions of
climate change can reflect the level of ambitiousness of national climate policies (Euro-
pean Commission 2017; Obydenkova and Salahodjaev 2017). Such results suggest that
climate citizenship does not take place in a vacuum but indeed in conjunction with societal
and political structures (Anderson, Böhmelt, and Ward 2017; Drummond et al. 2018). A
crucial empirical question here is how the interlinkages of public climate perceptions
relate to national structures with their various culpabilities and capabilities. While it is
well understood that public perceptions differ according to context, fewer studies have
focused on how context moderates relationships between climate perceptions.
In this paper we study the interlinkages of Europeans’ climate perceptions and ask
how they are conditioned by national contexts. We consider this an innovative approach,
since combining individual and national-level factors in cross-national analysis in the
European context has not been conducted extensively previously. At the individual
level we look at climate change concerns and perceived climate responsibility, and how
these relate to climate policy support and personal climate action. Of particular
interest is how these elements are interlinked as well as connected to the national
context in terms of national affluence, carbon emissions, and democracy. Our research
questions are:
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(1) How are climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy
support, and personal climate action linked at the individual level?
(2) How are different national-level factors (affluence, carbon emissions, and democ-
racy) linked to individual climate perceptions, in particular to perceived climate
responsibility, climate policy support, and personal climate action?
(3) Do national-level factors (affluence, carbon emissions, and democracy) have an
effect on the potential links between the studied individual level factors
(climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and
personal climate action)?
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss how climate concern, responsibility
and action are linked. We then proceed to consider how national contexts may facilitate
these linkages. Based on the literature reviewed, we develop a conceptual analytic
model, which intertwines individual climate citizenship with national-level affordances.
We then present our data and methods and proceed with empirical analyses and
discussion.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Public climate perceptions
Concern about the environment, and more specifically about climate change, has been
on the rise for the past decades (Pidgeon 2012; Capstick et al. 2015; Telesiene and
Gross 2015), partially linked to people’s increasing understanding of climate
change and its causes (Wolf and Moser 2011; Drews and van der Bergh 2016; Euro-
pean Commission 2017; Poortinga et al. 2019), as well as experiences with tempera-
ture anomalies and extreme weather events (Deryugina 2013; Donner and McDaniels
2013; Bergquist, Nilsson, and Schultz 2019). The more recent upswing in mass
climate activism, including the Fridays for Future youth strikes and Extinction Rebel-
lion, may also have played a role in raising public consciousness of the issue (e.g.
Bowman 2020).
Yet, expressing concern for climate change is fundamentally different from assuming
individual responsibility for it. Ascribing responsibility to oneself implies that one is
implicated in fostering climate change, or in seeking solutions to the problem. Concern
about climate change may also be expressed by people who do not wish or are not in a
position to take action. Conceptually, then, climate concern is a necessary yet insufficient
condition for climate responsibility.
According to well-established environmental psychological models, a sense of per-
sonal responsibility is essential for linking concerns into actions (e.g. Stern 2000;
Steg and de Groot 2010; Weber 2016). Previous research also suggests that a
sense of personal obligation is associated with support for climate and energy policies
and personal actions (Steg and de Groot 2010; Poortinga et al. 2012; Hagen, Middal,
and Pijawka 2016).
It is important to recognise that climate policies and actions are heterogeneous and
range all the way from technical measures to lifestyle changes (e.g. Figge, Young, and
Barkemeyer 2014). Policy measures that require more commitment and effort from citi-
zens, for example increased taxation and limitations of private motoring in certain
urban areas, are typically less favoured compared to measures that take place rather unno-
ticed, such as technical cost-effectiveness improvements (Drews and van der Bergh 2016;
Hagen, Middal, and Pijawka 2016; Rhodes, Axsen, and Jaccard 2017; Doran et al. 2019).
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Therefore, if we wish to understand the political implications of individuals’ perceived
climate responsibility, it is important to focus on specific policy measures and actions.
2.2. National factors and climate perceptions
For individual climate policy support and action to take place, it is important that people
have access to resources or capabilities that allow them to contribute to mitigating climate
change. There is also emerging evidence that context is important (e.g. Lee et al. 2015;
Poortinga et al. 2019). Further, it has been shown that citizens are in many ways bound
to economic, environmental, and socio-cultural national structures, which affect percep-
tions of environmental issues (Wolf and Moser 2011; Marquart-Pyatt 2012; Drews and
van der Bergh 2016). A complex interplay of resources, responsibilities and structures
can either open up or limit the spaces for climate-related responsibilities and actions,
which again can potentially shape the context.
Next, we explore how three core national factors concerning national economic,
environmental and socio-political wellbeing and performance – affluence, carbon emis-
sions, and democracy are associated with climate concern, perceived climate responsibil-
ity, and both climate policy support and personal climate action.
2.2.1. Affluence
The link between economic context and environmental action has been studied widely,
often based on the assumption that higher levels of national affluence (typically measured
as gross domestic product per capita; GDP per capita), enhances environmental concern
and action. This assumption is known as the affluence hypothesis (Diekmann and
Franzen 1999; Inglehart 1995).
The affluence hypothesis has received mixed support in cross-national empirical com-
parisons. While some studies report a positive relationship between (per capita) national
affluence and climate concern (Running 2013; Lo and Chow 2015; Knight 2016), others
report an inverse (Sandvik 2008; Givens and Jorgenson 2011; Kim and Wolinsky-
Nahmias 2014; Mostafa 2016) or non-significant (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug
2012) relationship. Similarly, previous research has found positive (Drews and van der
Bergh 2016) and negative (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014) associations of affluence
with perceived climate responsibility as well as with policy support and personal action.
These inconsistencies might be due to the heterogeneity of content and methodologi-
cal approaches. Studies that focus on general climate concern generally find positive
association with affluence, while this is not the case for studies that more specifically
focus on concern about the (negative) consequences of climate change (Kim and
Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014; Lo and Chow 2015). It has also been discussed how economic
resources can boost perceived responsibility to take action on climate change, and hence
make population in wealthier nations potentially more climate minded (Drews and van der
Bergh 2016). On the other hand, the negative consequences of climate change may not
become as visible to the public in wealthier nations as they are in poorer ones – they
thus may play a smaller part in everyday life in richer countries (Kim and Wolinsky-
Nahmias 2014).
2.2.2. Carbon emissions
Another well-researched national-level element associated with public environmental per-
ceptions relates to the state of the environment. Research on the topic has typically
4 P. Pohjolainen et al.
focused on the quality of the environment or weather anomalies. Much of this research has
been based on the assumption that exposure to environmental harms triggers environ-
mental concern. This is also known as the degradation hypothesis (Inglehart 1995;
Dunlap and Mertig 1997). Climate vulnerability indices and local air and water quality
are some of the typical indicators used in this research (e.g. Mostafa 2013; Kim and
Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). While carbon emissions have also been used as a proxy (e.g.
Givens and Jorgenson 2011) for climate vulnerability, carbon emissions are not directly
visible to or experienced by the public (cf. Spence et al. 2011) and are as such not a
direct measure of the degradation of the environment.
Carbon emissions may instead be regarded as indicators of local energy infrastruc-
tures, as they signal dependencies on certain types of energy production strategies.
Further, the links between carbon emissions and climate perceptions form an interesting
analytical setting for discussing climate policies, as countries with higher (per capita)
emission levels may be regarded as more responsible for tackling climate issues. Yet it
is unclear whether carbon emissions are linked to public climate perceptions.
There is some empirical evidence of a positive association between national (per
capita) carbon emissions and climate concern (Running 2013), although the relationship
often appears weak (Sandvik 2008; Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Lo and Chow
2015; Mostafa 2016). On the other hand, evidence from across the US suggests higher
carbon emissions are connected with lower levels of support for climate mitigation pol-
icies (Zahran et al. 2006).
2.2.3. Democracy
The relationship between democracy and environmental perceptions has received atten-
tion over the last 20 years (e.g. Dobson 1996; Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996; Fredriks-
son, Sauquet, andWollscheid 2016; Pickering, Bäckstrand, and Schlosberg 2020). Beyond
discussions on whether or not democracy is conducive to more environmentally respon-
sible societies, a prevalent question has been what kind of democracy is most effective in
solving environmental problems and what an environmental democracy could look like
(e.g. Smith 2003; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Fischer 2018). Empirical research has pre-
dominantly looked at possible connections between levels of democracy and various indi-
cators of environmental quality or degradation, including carbon dioxide emissions,
deforestation, pollution, and soil erosion; with mixed results (Midlarsky 2001; Winslow
2005; Li and Reuveny 2006).
Overall, democratic nations appear more ambitious in their environmental policy
targets (e.g. Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Burnell 2012; Obydenkova and Salahodjaev
2017; Povitkina 2018). They are also more politically open, transparent and responsive
to their citizens’ views, which is further linked to citizen participation and action – also
in relation to environmental issues (ibid.). Open and responsive societies are more trust-
ing, and trust in political institutions predicts support of environmental protection and
regulation (Lubell, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2007; Fairbrother 2016; Fairbrother, Johansson
Sevä, and Kulin 2019). As such, democratic structures can be expected to be a key
factor in creating active citizenship and socio-cultural space where ambitious climate pol-
icies can emerge.
There is some evidence that on the individual level democratic values are connected to
environmental concern (e.g. McCright, Dunlap, and Marquart-Pyatt 2016; Lewis, Palm,
and Feng 2019). However, less is known about how public perceptions are coupled
with the democracy levels of nations. As an exception, Marquart-Pyatt (2012) looked at
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contextual influences on environmental concerns and found democracy enhances the
effects of education on environmental awareness and efficacy, but not on willingness to
pay for environmental protection. As for the relationship between democracy and
climate change perceptions, few studies exist. However, one study suggests democratic
institutions and structures are important for translating public climate perceptions into
policy (Tjernström and Tietenberg 2008).
2.3. Research hypothesis
Based on the reviewed literature, this paper aims to develop a new perspective on how the
individual-level climate perceptions (climate concern, perceived responsibility, climate
policy support, and personal climate action) are linked to the national-level contextual
factors (affluence (per capita GDP), carbon emissions (per capita CO2) and democracy
(electoral democracy index)) (see Figure 1).
At the individual level, we conceptualise concern for the climate to have a social
impact when people feel personally responsible to reduce climate change, being also
linked to directly contributing to the problem or supporting climate policy acts.
At the national level, we first expect to see a positive effect of national-level affluence
in our analyses, as we are focusing on general level climate concern, perceived climate
responsibility, climate policy support and personal climate action, and not on concerns
about the negative consequences of climate change.
Second, we expect national carbon emissions to be less relevant to public climate per-
ceptions than national affluence. We acknowledge high carbon emissions are linked to
fossil energy infrastructures, which may create a feeling of a certain path dependency
and consecutive helplessness or unwillingness to question and tackle the status quo. On
the other hand, very low national carbon emissions could engender a feeling that one is
not implicated in climate change at all.
Third, we expect higher levels of climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, and
support for climate policies and action in more democratic nations. Though studies that look
at how democracy is connected to public climate views are mostly lacking, based on the
notion that democracy is typically coupled with stronger environmental governance and per-
formance nationally, citizens’ views could be expected to be in line with this.
Figure 1. Conceptual analytic model.
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Fourth, and following the previous hypothesis, we expect all the national level factors
to have an effect on the translation of climate concern and perceived responsibility into the
endorsement of climate policies and actions.
3. Data and methods
3.1. The European Social Survey
This paper uses data from Round 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS8), which featured
a dedicated module on public attitudes to climate change and energy (European Social
Survey 2016). The ESS has been conducted every other year from 2001 onwards, and
each time consists of a core section on a number of substantive issues alongside a
range of demographic variables and two rotating modules on issues of interest to the
social sciences. Data for ESS8 were collected in 2016 and 2017, and included 23 Euro-
pean countries, mostly from the EU/EFTA area (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom), plus Russia and Israel. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews
(ntotal = 44,387) in people’s own homes. The ESS has a number of specifications to
ensure quality of data in all countries and to optimise comparability of data, with major
efforts taken to enhance response rates. Detailed information on the dataset and pro-
cedures can be found on the ESS website (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org), and
in particular in the data documentation report.1
3.2. Measures
The analyses included measures of the concepts of Climate concern, Perceived climate
responsibility, Climate policy support, as well as people’s willingness to take Personal
climate action in the form of energy-saving behaviours. All variables were standardised
by turning them into Z-scores.
Climate concern was measured by the item ‘How worried are you about climate
change?’ Respondents could answer with 1 (not at all worried), 2 (not very worried), 3
(somewhat worried), 4 (very worried), or 5 (extremely worried).
Perceived climate responsibility was assessed by asking respondents ‘To what extent
do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change?’ The endpoint-
labelled 11-point answer scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal).
Climate policy support for two different climate policies entered the analyses. This
included a fossil fuel tax (‘increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal’)
and a ban on energy inefficient appliances (‘a law banning the sale of the least energy effi-
cient household appliances’). These two policies may have an impact on individuals’
everyday life in that they may make certain products and services more expensive and
limit the availability of household appliances, respectively. Respondents could indicate
their support for the two policies on a fully-labelled 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
against) to 5 (strongly in favour), with 3 (neither in favour nor against) as the midpoint.
Personal climate action was measured with two items on individual energy-saving
behaviours. First, to reflect people’s willingness to take efficiency measures to save house-
hold energy, respondents were asked ‘If you are to buy a large electrical appliance for your
home, how likely is it that you would buy one of the most energy efficient ones?’ The end-
point-labelled 11-point scale ranged from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).
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Second, to assess people’s willingness to engage in curtailment behaviours to save house-
hold energy, respondents were asked ‘In your daily life, how often do you do things to
reduce your energy use?’ This question was preceded by the following introductory
text: ‘There are some things that can be done to reduce energy use, such as switching
off appliances that are not being used, walking for short journeys, or only using the
heating or air conditioning when really needed’. Respondents could answer the question
using a fully-labelled 6-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6 (always).
Three national-level indicators were considered in addition to these individual-level
variables. These comprised (a) per capita gross domestic product (GDP), as an indicator
of national affluence, (b) per capita carbon emissions (CO2), as an indicator of a country’s
contribution to climate change, and (c) electoral democracy index (ED), as an indicator of
the extent to which a country operates a representative democracy under the rule of law.
Just as the individual-level variables, these national-level indicators were standardised so
that the effects can be compared.
Per capita GDP figures for 2016 are in current U.S. dollars, and obtained from data
produced by the World Bank (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org) and OECD (https://
data.oecd.org). They are calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabri-
cated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Per capita fossil fuel carbon emissions figures for 2014 were obtained from the Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Tennessee, United States (http://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov). This can
be considered a valid indicator for the total greenhouse gas emissions, as, for example,
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the EU28 are dominated by fossil CO2 emissions,
which are more than 80% of the total GHGs (Crippa et al. 2019).
We used the Electoral democracy index generated by the Varieties of Democracy
project (V-Dem Institute, https://www.v-dem.net/en). It covers electoral principles of
democracy plus freedom of association and access to alternative sources of information
(ibid). The V-Dem project assesses also four other aspects of democracy, namely, the
liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian components (Lindberg et al. 2014).
However, these can be seen to focus on aspects that are somewhat marginal to the core
definition of democracy, in other words potentially blurring the effect that the electoral
system and civil liberties can have on public climate perceptions. Hence, we choose to
focus merely on the electoral democracy (ED) in our analysis.
All analyses included the demographic variables of gender, age, level of education,
and income as covariates. Gender was included as a dummy variable (0 female, and 1
male). Age was centred on its grand mean (47.0), and expressed in 10 year deviations
from that mean. The level of education consisted of the ESS version of the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and was centred on its grand mean of 4.0 on
a scale from 1 (less than lower secondary) to 7 (higher tertiary education/≥MA level). As
for income, dummy variables were used to indicate national-level quintile groups of
household income as well as those with missing values.
3.3. Data analysis
The data were analysed using a multilevel modelling approach, with the MLwiN 2.36 soft-
ware package, based on our conceptual analytic model (see Figure 1). Individual
responses (level 1) were nested within the 23 countries (level 2) that took part in
Round 8 of the ESS. Distributions of the studied variables can be found in the Appendix.
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A series of multilevel models were constructed with personal responsibility, policy
support, and personal action as the dependent variables, respectively. In order to
examine the association of the socio-demographics with perceived responsibility and
climate policy support and action we constructed a number of baseline models (Models
0) in which we only included the variables of gender, age, level of education, and house-
hold income.
The first set of analytical models (Models 1a, 1b, and 1c) focuses on the interactions
between the individual-level variables of climate concern, perceived climate responsibil-
ity, and both climate policy support and personal climate action (Research question 1).
The models first predict perceived responsibility by including climate concern as the inde-
pendent variable (Model 1a). Second, climate policy support and action are predicted by
incorporating perceived climate responsibility (Model 1b), and thirdly, both climate
concern and perceived climate responsibility (Model 1c) as the independent variables.
In all cases, the demographic variables of gender, age, level of education, and household
income were included as controls. First, random intercept models were constructed to esti-
mate the fixed effects for the independent variables. Subsequently, a series of random
intercept, random slope models were constructed to estimate the cross-country variation
in the size of these effects.
The second set of models (Models 2a and 2b) focuses on effect of national-level indi-
cators on individual-level variables of perceived climate responsibility (Model 2a), and
both climate policy support and personal climate action (Model 2b) (Research question
2). They included the national-level indicators of (a) per capita GDP, (b) per capita
carbon emissions, and (c) electoral democracy as additional independent variables,
respectively. Separate models were constructed for each of these indicators. This approach
was chosen as the number of countries involved is not sufficient to reliably estimate mul-
tiple national-level parameters at the same time. Only the fixed effects for the contextual
indicators are reported.
The third set of models (Models 3a and 3b) further expands the analysis to examine the
effect of national-level indicators on the interactions between individual-level variables
(Research question 3). This was done by looking at the cross-level interactions. For the
Model 3a that have perceived climate responsibility as the dependent variable, interactions
of climate concern with the contextual national-level variables of (a) per capita GDP, (b)
per capita carbon emissions, and (c) electoral democracy were included, respectively. For
the Model 3b that have climate policy support and personal climate action as the depen-
dent variable, interactions of perceived climate responsibilitywith the contextual national-
level variables of (a) per capita GDP, (b) per capita carbon emissions, and (c) electoral
democracy were included, respectively. Again, separate models were constructed for each
of these cross-level interactions. Overall, these interaction models also include the con-
stituent variables on their own.
4. Results
Our first research question (RQ1) concerned the individual-level effects between climate
concern, perceived climate responsibility (PCR), climate policy support, and personal
climate action. Models 1a, 1b and 1c (Table 1) show that these effects are statistically sig-
nificant, as expected. The effect is particularly strong between climate concern and PCR,
but can be seen clearly also in how climate policy support and personal climate action is
determined. Interestingly, PCR has a somewhat stronger effect on policy support and per-
sonal action than climate concern alone.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 11
Our second research question (RQ2) was to look at the effect of the national-level vari-
ables on these individual-level perceptions. Models 2a and 2b in Table 2 shows that both
GDP and electoral democracy (ED) have a positive effect on PCR, and CO2 emissions a
negative effect. For climate policy support, GDP is linked to favouring fossil fuel tax, but
no other connection between contextual level factors and climate policy support are stat-
istically significant. For personal climate action, there is perceived significant effect
between electoral democracy and energy curtailment and efficiency, but no other connec-
tions between national-level factors.
Our third research focus (RQ3) concerned the moderating effect that the national-level
potentially has on the connections between both climate concern and PCR, and PCR and
climate policy support and personal climate action (Models 3a and 3b in Table 3). For the
former, testing the cross-level interactions points out that only electoral democracy signifi-
cantly interacts with climate concern: hence in democratic societies the connection
between concern and responsibility becomes stronger. For the PCR – climate policy
support and personal climate action link, GDP and electoral democracy interact with all
the climate policy support and personal climate action variables, and carbon emissions
interact with the energy curtailment negatively. This suggests that particularly affluence
and democracy can strengthen the effect that the PCR has on both climate policy
support and personal climate action.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This study looked at both how individual climate perceptions of concern, perceived
responsibility, policy support, and personal action are connected and shaped by
national-level factors of affluence, carbon emissions and democracy. We asked how
climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and personal
climate action are interlinked at the individual level (RQ1). Next, we looked at how
national-level affluence (per capita GDP), carbon emissions (per capita CO2), and democ-
racy (electoral democracy) shape perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support,
and personal climate action (RQ2). Finally, we looked at whether the relationships
between climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and
personal climate action differ according to the aforementioned national-level factors
(RQ3).
We found a strong positive connection between climate concern and perceived climate
responsibility, and further, between both climate concern and perceived climate responsi-
bility and various climate policy support & personal climate action measures (cf. Rhodes,
Axsen, and Jaccard 2017; Hagen, Middal, and Pijawka 2016; Drews and van der Bergh
2016). In the latter case the effects were stronger between perceived climate responsibility
and both climate policy support and action, suggesting that climate concern alone is not
particularly strongly related to both policy support and action compared to perceived
responsibility. Yet the connection between climate concern and perceived responsibility
makes it an important element that helps to understand the role of perceived responsibility
in public climate views. Hence our study suggests that perceived climate responsibility
can be regarded a factor that helps to understand how individual level climate views
are connected (RQ1) (cf. Steg and de Groot 2010; Weber 2016). Further studies could
test how these interactions might vary with more nuanced measurements of perceived
responsibility, such as those focusing on certain specific themes and action.
We found national affluence and democracy are positively connected to perceived
climate responsibility, and that people in more affluent countries are also more likely to
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support higher taxation of fossil fuels (RQ2). However, affluence was not significantly
linked to our other measures of climate policy support and personal climate action. We
also found that people in more democratic countries are more likely to engage in
climate action, but the level of democracy had no effect on support of climate policy.
Our analyses suggest that the link between climate concern and perceived climate
responsibility is stronger in more democratic countries (RQ3). Moreover, both national
affluence and democracy strengthen the link between perceived climate responsibility
and all our measures for both climate policy support and personal climate action. This
suggests national affluence and democracy may provide citizens with capabilities that
facilitate individual action.
Overall, there were differences in how the national-level factors are connected to
public climate perceptions. In our analyses the effect of affluence was central, as expected
(Lo and Chow 2015; Drews and van der Bergh 2016; Knight 2016). It is important to note
that democracy, which has seen far less study in this regard, had a similarly robust effect.
Democracy is known to be coupled with more ambitious environmental policy targets and
institutions (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Povitkina 2018), in addition to which citizens of
democratic nations are politically more involved and able to participate in decision-
making (Burnell 2012; Obydenkova and Salahodjaev 2017).
Indeed, the importance of democracy merits further study. There is a need to investi-
gate how different forms of democracy are linked to attitudes towards climate change. In
this study we only touched upon the issue, and moreover, we utilised a broad measure of
electoral democracy. Future studies may be able to explore how different forms of democ-
racy, such as liberal, egalitarian, deliberative or participatory democracy (see e.g. V-dem
2018), are linked to climate perceptions, and to what extent these different types are
helpful in translating climate concerns into responsibility and endorsement of climate
policies.
When it comes to carbon emissions, the effects were practically nonexistent through-
out our analyses, suggesting that they are not essentially linked to, for example, individual
climate responsibility among citizens as much of the previous literature suggests (Kvaloy,
Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Lo and Chow 2015; Mostafa 2016). However, as the data
were collected in 2016, and there has been a rather recent, strong upswing in the public
climate policy discussions in Europe (Bergquist and Warshaw 2019; Wright and
Nyberg 2019), public perceptions may look different at the moment. Public discussion
can be considered a particularly powerful tool when it comes to carbon emissions, as
they engender an ‘invisible threat’ locally; climate change is a more complex problem
to perceive compared to many other environmental hazards. It is also important to note
that we used a measure of carbon emissions per capita and not per nation. It is possible
the latter might produce a different effect on feeling responsibility, steering the focus
more towards (inter)national climate policies.
One practical policy implication from our study concerns public campaigns that could
not only inform people on climate change but also encourage them to take personal
responsibility to increase climate policy support and action. Moreover, national affluence
and democracy are clearly connected to individual-level perceptions, and our data also
shows that there is remarkable variation in how the national determinants and public per-
ceptions are distributed between countries (see Appendix). This suggests that ambitious
long-term climate targets and related execution of global climate agreements in Europe
can potentially be achieved better by focusing also on country-level differences in political
and economic conditions.
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Addressing these issues could help build active climate citizenship and usher societies
towards a stronger joint agreement for structuring successful climate polity solutions. We
may raise the question of to what extent Europe can afford to be locked into narrow-
minded thinking, concerning not only climate change, but the future of the continent in
general. Even before the COVID-19 crisis it was anticipated that Europe would face tur-
bulent times not only concerning sustainable energy transitions (de la Esperanza Mata
Pérez, Scholten, and Smith Stegen 2019), but also wider economic, environmental and
socio-cultural development (e.g. Giddens 2014). Hence it would be particularly important
to address these issues in the current situation.
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